Decision time has arrived on the controversial nuclear cooperation proposal that was first proposed by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005. After a long delay, the Indian government has sidestepped domestic critics of the deal and is asking the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors to consider a new "India-specific" safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional "civilian" reactors. The IAEA Board could meet on the matter by the end of July. Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration will ask the other 44 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from longstanding NSG guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. Comprehensive safeguards are intended to prevent the use of civilian nuclear technology and material for weapons purposes. Because the NSG and IAEA traditionally operate by consensus, any one of a number of states can act to block or modify the ill-conceived arrangement. They have good reason and a responsibility to do so. Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the deal fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of the member states of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike 178 other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It continues to produce fissile material and expand its arsenal. Yet, the arrangement would give India the rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that have been reserved only for members of the NPT. It creates a dangerous distinction between "good" proliferators and "bad" proliferators sending out misleading signals to the international community with regard to NPT norms. In fact, the current proposal threatens to further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material. It would also indirectly contribute to the expansion of India's nuclear arsenal with possible consequences for a nuclear arms race in Asia. In particular, India is seeking an "India-specific" safeguards agreement that could