Responding to the crisis, Ajjinanda Poovaiah, an activist of the NGO, Wildlife first, filed a well-researched complaint before the Karnataka Lokayukta (state ombudsman) in February 2003, alleging official corruption and mismanagement under the project. He offered prima facie evidence for penetration of commercial tiger and elephant poachers, resurgence of illegal logging, habitat damage through needless manipulations and financial fraud in Nagarahole. The Lokayukta, a retired judge of the Supreme Court of India, conducted a thorough field investigation with assistance from the complainant. This investigation and linked official inquiries showed that forest protection had virtually collapsed in Nagarahole during the project period. An uncontrolled fire had scorched 9000 hectares (15 per cent of the park area) in 1999. Not only had killings of elephants reached a new peak, professional tiger poachers from central India had crept in during 2002. At least 12,000 timber trees worth Rs 51 million had been cut and smuggled. Natural habitats had been destructively manipulated-Rs 7 million misspent applying chemical fertilizers to bamboo culms was a typical example. Under the village ecodevelopment corruption had run riot. According to the Lokayukta's report, estimated total losses were at a staggering Rs 60 million based on a partial sample. Unable to ignore this stench of bad publicity, the government prematurely terminated the Nagarahole project, leaving the World Bank red-faced. Dozens of forest officials, high and low, are now facing prosecution based on the Lokayukta's indictment. Project design and evaluations were reduced to a farce by the incompetence ofBank staff and consultants. P K Sen, former director of Project Tiger, estimates consultancies and Bank overheads consumed 45 per cent of project funds. Five years later, other than a laughably self-congratulatory documentary film made by a consultant-and stumps of illegally felled trees and bleached elephant bones in the forest-there is little to show for the 'expertise' and 'innovative models' the Bank inflicted on the unsuspecting tigers. World Bank's apologists will shrug all this off as a failure unique to Nagarahole, claiming Bank's conservation approach has worked wonderfully at other IEDP sites. However, straws in the wind suggest that much the same thing happened elsewhere too. The report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for 2006 severely criticized the project, specifically mentioning irregularities to the tune of Rs 120 million detected in the village ecodevelopment schemes at Buxa, Gir, Pench and Nagarahole reserves. A sincere official who refused to partake in this bonanza was hounded out of Ranthambhore. Even in the Periyar project-which is a poster boy for the IEDP -all is not well according to a study by Sanjay Gubbi from Wildlife Conservation Society: negative human impacts, which the project hoped to reduce, are mounting. There is little evidence of increased public support for conservation. Assessment of another Bank project, in Kalakkad-Mundanthurai by Arjunan of Pondicherry University, shows the same pattern. Therefore, the World Bank's claims about the special expertise it will bring to tiger conservation rings somewhat hollow. The government must consult widely and reflect seriously about the Bank's tiger initiative. At least one thing has changed since IEDP swept through last time: the robust Indian economy can now afford to save the national animal without recourse to huge international loans. Acting on the Tiger Task Force's recommendations, the Prime Minister has ensured there is enough money-Rs 6,000 million in the current plan-for protecting tigers. The real challenge lies in spending the money wisely, resisting temptations of the World Bank's 'convening power' and 'expertise'. Wildlife Conservation Society, India K Ullas Karanth, Down To Earth Feature