Siddharth Varadarajan The government feels vagueness keeps international critics at bay. Following the formal withdrawal of Left support to the United Progressive Alliance, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and its three partners have issued a statement challenging the government's decision to keep the text of the safeguards agreement negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a "secret.' Fearing a disconnect between the government's assurances and the actual text, the Left said it had five pointed concerns about the agreement that the UPA had not addressed. These were: (1) In case the U.S. or other countries in the NSG renege on fuel supply assurances for imported reactors, will we have the ability to withdraw these reactors from IAEA safeguards? (2) If U.S./NSG countries renege on fuel supply assurances, can we withdraw our indigenous civilian reactors from IAEA safeguards? (3) If we have to bring nuclear fuel from the non-safeguarded part of our nuclear programme for these reactors in case of fuel supply assurances not being fulfilled, will we have the ability to take (the spent fuel) back again? (4) What are the corrective steps that India can take if fuel supplies are interrupted by the U.S./NSG countries? (5) What are the conditions that India will have to fulfil if the corrective steps are to be put into operation? Though the Left has raised five separate queries, they all revolve around the one big imponderable that has animated both the United States government and the nuclear deal's non-proliferation critics internationally ever since India came up with its separation plan on March 2, 2006: Just what exactly is meant by the phrase "corrective measures'? These are the measures India says it may take "to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.' The phrase, which appears in paragaraph 15(c) of the Separation Plan, was a condition the Indian negotiators tagged on to the list of fuel supply assurances they said India needed in order to accept the American demand to "place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.' Both during the hard-fought talks on March 1 and 2, 2006, and subsequently, in the negotiations the two sides held on the 123 agreement, the Indian team constantly parried all American attempts to spell out or define just what was meant by "corrective measures.' Egged on by the American non-proliferation lobby, U.S. officials wanted to know, for example, whether corrective measures would include the withdrawal of a civilian facility from safeguards. Indian officials stonewalled, pointing out that since the eventuality of corrective measures could only arise if the continuous operation of India's civilian nuclear reactors was interrupted, it was essential that fuel arrangements be as foolproof and watertight as possible. When, during the 123 negotiations, the Indian team found the U.S. side backsliding on the commitments contained in paragraph 15 of the Separation Plan, a major fight ensued. The result was that the entire paragraph was incorporated into the 123 agreement by