Kudankulam seems to be rocking India’s ambitious nuclear power programme. A crisis-like atmosphere prevails due to the stoppage of pre-commissioning fuel loading in Kudankulam’s 1000 MW capacity first reactor. Why? Because of the post-Fukushima apprehensions, no doubt, but equally because of lack of adequate comprehension of the nuclear issue, further complicated by domestic politics. The need is to disentangle the issues involved and enhance public awareness. But first the facts. There is very little commonality between the Fukushima reactors and the Kudankulam power project. Whereas the Kudankulam nuclear power units belong to the third generation of reactor design evolution, the Fukushima reactors belong to the first generation. This specially applies to safety parameters. Kudankulam reactor components are housed in a 1.2 meter thick pre-stressed concrete containment lined inside with thick steel plates. The containment is hermetically sealed and tested so as to remain leak-proof even in an environment created during a hypothetical accident. The safety factor in Kudankulam reactor design is many stages superior to the first generation reactors. There are multiple barriers for the release of radioactivity to the environment — fuel matrix, fuel cladding, the piping system, besides the hermetically sealed containment building. The aim is to separate the reactor from the environment, and the environment from the reactor. Secondly, it is dangerous to mix up geographical locations. Japan stands on the tip of the so-called “Pacific Ring of Fire” — some 1500 earthquakes are recorded there annually. The March 11 earthquake of magnitude 9 was the biggest ever in Japan, with the epicentre some 130 km. from the coast. The resulting tsunami was more than 7 meters high. As against this, India is relatively stable with seismic activity confined to the Himalayan regions. The southern plateau is relatively more stable. It would be dangerous to link up geological events from one region to another. It has also to be remembered that the first two Fukushima reactors hit by the accident had outlived their 40-year life-span — extended without technological upgrading — because of the greed of the Japanese industrial magnates owning the reactors. Even these aged reactors were giving handsome profits. The only striking commonality between the Kudankulam and Fukushima reactors — and those at Kalpakkam and Tarapur in India — is a sea coast location. For decades, all these sea-coast reactors have been operating without any risk or damage to the coastal marine life. And this serves as conclusive evidence that the apprehensions being roused by vested interests among the Kudankulam fishermen are baseless. Even so, the Fukushima accident came as a shock in India and the lessons were carefully analyzed, followed by prompt counter-veiling measures — first and foremost, for the Kudankulam project. Specifically, for the purpose of cooling nuclear fuel when the reactor is shut down, there are now four independent systems installed in operational and upcoming projects, each with its own 8 MW diesel generator, so that if the first or second systems malfunction, there are two more as a back-up arrangement. Added on, for the first time at Kudankulam reactors, a passive heat removal system has been installed. The system ensures cooling of the nuclear reactor core in a passive manner — that is without any pumps, valves, etc., requiring power supply. There is more. A further feature added to the Kudankulam design is called the “core catcher”. In the event of an accident, where the molten nuclear fuel were to breach the reactor pressure vessel, it falls on to a matrix containing a large amount of neutron-absorbing substances (such as boron). On mixing with this material, the nuclear fuel is rendered incapable of starting a nuclear chain reaction. Only the latest design provides for this safety back-up. The post-Fukushima jolt to India’s nuclear programme appears to be far more severe than it seemed six months ago after the earthquake and tsunami devastation in Japan. In fact, post-Fukushima apprehensions had a world-wide impact on the nuclear industry in countries such as France, the United States, China and Russia, where nuclear energy plays a significant role in electricity generation. As in India’s case, all these countries have, after evaluating the lessons of Fukushima and inducting appropriate safety features in their existing and ongoing nuclear projects, continued with their nuclear expansion and maintenance plans. The United States has, after a decade’s gap, launched the construction of two fresh Westinghouse 1200 MW power reactors and budgeted for an expanding nuclear programme. China — has expanded its nuclear power construction, with the vision of making nuclear electricity generation the principal alternative to fossil fuel. The only country to tread a different path — for political, not scientific, reasons — is Germany. It could afford this because of European conditions. For, across the border, Slovakia, Russia the Czech Republic and even tiny Lithuania have launched the construction of nuclear power reactors for exporting electricity to Germany. Good, ready-made export business! But costlier power for Germans — drug manufacturer Bayers has protested. The Indian scenario is just the contrary, for electric energy is in acutly shortsupply and this shortage is growing. Nuclear energy alone can help, given fossil fuels’ fast depletion. The current developments may lead to a retrospective look at the nuclear programme. The ambitious Indian nuclear programme has, right from its inception, treaded a bumpy path. The scientific and technological challenges that the nuclear programme poses have been supplemented by a three-decade-long cordon sanitaire — a total sanctions and technology denial regime imposed by the Western powers led by the United States. Yet, overcoming the stifling sanctions in the wake of the Pokhran-I test, the Indian nuclear establishment performed the Herculean task of building a magnificent nuclear edifice: nuclear infrastructure industries, heavy water plants, research reactors, and a chain of R & D centres of which any country could be proud of. As many as 18 PHWRs (pressurised heavy water reactors) were built, generating 4580 Mwe electricity, with a safety record that is among the best. The Pokhran-II test series — one of the finest in the global chain of tests — showed the climax, a high water mark in nuclear weapon capability. Notwithstanding what domestic skeptics say, American and other international scientists have recognised India’s nuclear attainments. Said Siegfried S.Hecker, in his testimony at the US Senate Committee on Appropriations: “I found that whereas sanctions slowed (India’s) progress in nuclear energy, they made India self-sufficient and world leaders in fast reactor technology.” The US administration was compelled to lift the sanctions, and seek Indian cooperation in civilian nuclear projects and the global non-proliferation drive, accepting to India’s weapon status. The demise of the sanctions regime and the Indo-US civilian nuclear accord were a great victory for India and Indian scientists. A bright vista has opened for India’s nuclear programme, followed by a change in the scenario — rapid imports of uranium fuel to enable optimum capacity utilization of the existing PHWRs, and expanding PHWR projects. Global nuclear scientific interaction began. Nuclear energy targets were pushed upwards; the target for 2020 was raised from 20,000 Mwe to 30,000 Mwe, and the target for 2032 fixed by the Planning Commission was 63,000 Mwe. In this setting, Kudankulam — with its first reactor ready to generate 1000 MW electricity — poses a severe challenge to the entire nuclear programme: it may increase power generation shortage and render a big blow to the entire Indian economy. Hopefully, the impasse will be resolved. The nuclear establishment, on its part, has to learn a few lessons on the need to step up nuclear awareness among the populace in a big way. The writer has done a well-received book on India’s nuclear programme.