Why conduct N-tests when accurate, N-armed missiles will deter better? Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's long drawn out battle to end India's nuclear isolation is almost over. All that now remains is for the US Congress to endorse the 123 agreement. Contrary to a belief fostered by the Opposition, and swallowed uncritically by the media, this isn't going to be a Cakewalk. For the Left's filibuster has left the US Congress with no time to go through the mandated procedures. As a result, both houses of Congress will have to adopt 'fast-track' procedures to facilitate the 123 agreement before the Bush administration demits charge. It's by no means certain that they will be able to do so. Against this, the government's decision not to place any orders for nuclear power plants till the US completes the endorsement is not only gracious but also wise. Not only does it allow US firms to put pressure upon the two houses to take the extraordinary measures that are now needed, but it reinforces the main argument that the Bush administration cited to push the deal through, namely that India is a responsible nuclear power. By agreeing to wait, India has acknowledged its debt to the US, as also demonstrated its innate desire to play fair. This should certainly go some way towards reassuring the waverers in the two houses. Now that the struggle is almost over, it's time to assess what India stands to gain, and also what it could conceivably lose from entering the nuclear club on the terms hammered out in Vienna. The immediate gain is that it opens the way for foreign investment in nuclear plants capable of generating some 30,000 MW. Coming on top of the coal-based ultra-mega power plants that have already been sanctioned, these can end the nation's crippling power shortage in as little as five years. Critics of the deal assert that India has more than enough coal to meet its foreseeable needs. They have also claimed that nuclear power is up to 10 times as expensive as coal-based power. Both arguments are wildly wrong. India's coal is poor in quality and its reserves are anything but inexhaustible. To maintain an eight per cent growth rate, the country will have to add 2,00,000 MW of generating capacity in the next decade, another 4,00,000 MW in the decade that follows, and double of that in the decade 2028-38. At the rate of coal consumption that is thus to be expected in 2038, our coal reserves are likely to run out in a decade. Coming to their second argument, the actual investment cost of nuclear plants is likely to be Rs 8 crore per MW. This is more expensive than coal only so long as we do not factor in the large, and rising, cost to society of coal-based plants