The illogic of Delhi's botched BRTS experiment One of the brains behind Delhi's BRTS (bus rapid transit system) has temporarily had to relinquish the privilege of driving around in a Mercedes. With so many countries in the world, there are bound to be precedents somewhere. We have been told that 80 cities in the world have successfully experimented with BRTS, Bogota being most widely cited. It has a population of 7 million (8 million if the extended metropolitan area is included) and a population density of 3914 per sq km. It also has dedicated bicycle paths, with a total length of 303 km covered by these networks. Delhi has a population of 13 million (22 million if the extended metropolitan area is included) and a population density of 7758. Barring the Metro (Mass Rapid Transit System), it has dedicated tracks for nothing, including ubiquitous tractors. Tractors are covered by the Motor Vehicles Act. How many tractors roaming around Delhi have registration plates? The point is that one should start with the presumption that laws are not meant to be enforced in Delhi, including those on old cars, 27-year-old Mercs included. Cops are too busy with VIP security. Delhi has 4.9 million private vehicles, including 3.3 million two-wheelers, and that figure, from the latest Delhi government Economic Survey, is two years old. There are 5.2 million commercial vehicles. The private car figure translates into 85 cars per 1000 population. The national average is 8 cars per 1000 population. Roads, elevated road corridors, flyovers and bridges apart, planning for public transport in Delhi has meant the Metro, Regional Rail Network, restructuring of the DTC and the now controversial High Capacity Bus System (HCBS). Edward Lorenz, the father of chaos theory, died recently. If one HCBS corridor could lead to such chaos, imagine what would happen if all seven corridors were simultaneously unleashed. That a large number of private vehicles caters to only 30 per cent of Delhi's demand for transport, buses still account for 60 per cent. There can be no quarrel with the statement that one should create incentives for the use of public transport and disincentives for private transport, and one should not forget cheap small cars that will soon be available. Singapore and Japan are two countries where costs of private transport are inordinately high. But cost is a relative term and disincentives for private transport must be spliced with efficient public transport. One should not mix up this switch from private to public with decisions about what form that public transport should take. Delhi is a test case for the BRTS (Bus Rapid Transit System), because it is more visible and cities like Ahmedabad, Indore, Jaipur, Pune, Visakhapatnam and Bhopal are about to follow, with possible funding from Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission. Learning or unlearning from Delhi is important. The Delhi experiment should also have been easier. At least 20 per cent of Delhi's land area is under roads (per capita figure is lower), the highest in the country. Beijing has only 6 per cent. Delhi government spokespersons have told us the Metro will cost Rs 100 crore per km. The HCBS/BRTS will cost only Rs 10 crore per km, including rolling stock. If that is the case, cities throughout the world should be falling over backwards to choose BRTS. They don't, so clearly the answer isn't that obvious. Nor is Bogota's BRTS (named TransMilenio) controversy-free and it isn't quite the case that this is a system that has been completed. The first phase only opened in December 2000 and subsequent phases are stuck in public debate. If one does not compare apples and oranges, the cost advantage of BRTS over something like a Metro is not that remarkable. The inspiration behind Bogota's BRTS was Curitiba in Brazil. Notice that Curitiba is a success in urban planning, not BRTS per se, and picking out the BRTS while ignoring the rest of urban planning is silly. In Curitiba, development was channelled along BRTS corridors. It is a slightly different matter to introduce BRTS in a city that already has pre-existing patterns of development. Notice also that when Curitiba now plans to extend public transport, it no longer relies on the BRTS alone. Of course, many cities have BRTS. However, the key to a successful BRTS hinges not so much on the nature of vehicles, but the nature of routes. Does one have preferential treatment for buses in lanes, cross roads and traffic intersections? Does one have dedicated high-occupancy vehicle lanes that buses use? Does one have dedicated bus lanes? Are these dedicated bus lanes carved out of existing lanes or are new ones created through elevated roads and tunnels? Relative cost comparisons of BRTS versus MRTS (light rail-based) can mean operating costs or capital costs. And cross-country experience tells us there is little to choose between the two on operating costs and the answer also depends on fuel (diesel, electricity) used. The capital cost comparison is messier. The more efficient a BRTS is (such as with elevated roads and tunnels), the closer its capital costs approach those of MRTS. The less efficient a BRTS is (such as use of existing roads), the cheaper its construction. Myopic cost-savings are not the only objective. Had we wanted an efficient BRTS for Delhi, we would have been better off with a BRTS that cost Rs 100 crore per km than Rs 10 crore per km. By opting for Rs 10 crore per km, we opted for chaos. There is another lesson that can be teased out of the cross-country experience. If some degree of green-field urban planning is possible (Curitiba, Bogota, Ottawa), the natural choice is the BRTS. The BRTS is also the natural choice in cities that have population sizes smaller than 1 million, or perhaps 5 million in the Indian context. It would probably have worked in Gurgaon or Faridabad and should work in Indore, Jaipur, Visakhapatnam and Bhopal. Ahmedabad and Pune are probably "maybes'. But the prerequisites don't seem to exist for the heart of Delhi. The NCR hinterland is a different matter, with the BRTS implemented as a feeder network for the MRTS in the heart. One doesn't have to be a skilled urban planner to appreciate this and much of it is plain common sense. The 5.8 km stretch for Ambedkar Nagar to Moolchand was an unnecessarily expensive experiment driven largely by dogma, and expense doesn't mean monetary costs alone. Why did one have to pick a corridor with such a lot of bicycle and pedestrian traffic? Quoted out of context, T.S. Eliot said, "A thousand policemen directing traffic cannot tell you why you come or where you go.' The writer is a noted economist bdebroy@gmail.com